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Abstract

will specifically consider proof-of-ownership, that is, enabling authors to prove to an arbiter that they were inMany systems have been proposed for protecting the volved in the authoring process. We will also consider
intellectual property of multimedia authors and owners how our architectures can be adapted to fingerprinting,
from the public at large, who have access to the multime- that is, enabling authors to determine the identity of an
dia only after it is published. In this paper, we consider the author who has “leaked” a copy of the work without perproblem of protecting authors’ intellectual property rights mission from the other authors.
from insiders, such as collaborating authors and producWatermarking solutions to the above problems have
ers, who interact with the creative process before publi- been proposed in the case where the adversary has accation. We describe the weaknesses of standard proof-of- cess only to the published work, i.e. is an outsider. In
ownership watermarking approaches against dishonest in- Section 2, we will describe the weaknesses in these sosiders, and propose several possible architectures for sys- lutions against an adversary who is part of the authoring
tems that avoid these weaknesses. We further show how process — i.e. is an insider — who in a naı̈ve protocol
these architectures can be adapted for fingerprinting in the may be able to obtain a copy of the unwatermarked origipresence of dishonest insiders.
nal. While some previous algorithms have considered watermarks for representing the collaborative effort of several contributors [19, 8], protocols by which such waKeywords. digital watermarking, collaboration, multi- termarked objects are created have not been extensively
ple watermarking, proof of ownership, fingerprinting
studied.
In Section 3, we will describe several possible protocols for multimedia authoring in the proof-of-ownership
1 Introduction
setting that avoid the weaknesses in naı̈ve protocols by
preventing insiders from obtaining a copy of the unwaterMultimedia security research has focused upon security marked original. We will further show how these protoof published content, and upon protecting the intellectual cols can be adapted for fingerprinting in Section 4.
property of the content owners and creators from malicious end users. These systems, however, do nothing to
resolve intellectual property disputes that arise prior to 2 Intellectual Property Protection
publication, for example, between collaborating authors.
Using Watermarks
We will consider intellectual property protection in the
case where the disputing parties are (or claim to be) involved in the creation stage of the content in dispute. We A digital watermark is a secret signal embedded into a
multimedia object that can only be detected or recovered
∗ First published in the EURASIP Journal of Applied Signal Processby someone possessing a secret key. Many techniques
ing 2004:14 (2004), published by Hindawi Publishing Corporation
for embedding watermarks in all manner of multimedia
† School of Information Technology and Computer Science, The Uniobjects
have been proposed; a survey is given in [13].
versity of Wollongong, NSW, 2522, Australia. E-mail: nps@uow.edu.au
‡ ibid. E-mail: rei@uow.edu.au
In the watermarking solution to the proof-of-ownership
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termark into the finished object prior to publication, and
publishes the watermarked object instead of the original
version. If, at a later time, an imposter claims to be
the originator of the published object, the true owner can
prove his or her ownership by demonstrating the existence
of the secret watermark to an arbiter.
This solution assumes that the adversary has access
only to the published version of the object. Existing watermarking systems generally make an implicit assumption that watermarking is more or less the final step before
publication, since they take a finalised object as input and
output the object to be published. Without an additional
protocol to govern access to the object prior to watermarking and publication, an insider is able to take a copy of the
object without a watermark.
Clearly an adversary in possession of an unwatermarked object can circumvent the protocol described
above, since this copy does not contain the legitimate
owners’ secret watermark. In this paper, we will discuss protocols for authoring multimedia such that no party
gains access to an unwatermarked version of the content,
thus preserving the integrity of the protocol described
above even in the presence of dishonest insiders.
Of course, any attack on a watermarking system that is
available to outsiders is also available to insiders. In this
paper, however, we will only consider attacks by insiders
that are not available to outsiders. Our example watermarks will be chosen for ease of exposition rather than
security against conventional outsider attacks.

2.1 Multiple Watermarking
We will use multiple watermarking to represent the intellectual property rights of multiple contributors, i.e. each
contributor will have a personal watermark and the final
object will contain the collection of these personal watermarks. An overview of schemes that allow multiple watermarks to be embedded into a single object is given in
[19].
We distinguish three classes of multiple watermark:
• a re-watermark created by watermarking the object
with several different watermarks in turn;
• a segmented watermark created by dividing the object into pieces and embedding a different watermark
into each piece; and

• a composite watermark created by composing several different watermarks into a single watermark
(i.e. the composition is a kind of shared secret) and
embedding this composition.
Separability. For our purposes, we assume that all of
our multiple watermarks are separable, that is, that it is
possible to detect each component watermark individually
in the watermarked object.
Segmented watermarks are always separable, since
each segment (and therefore watermark) is tested independently.
Watermarks produced by re-watermarking are usually
separable if the underyling algorithm is robust against
re-watermarking. For the applications discussed in this
paper, watermarks are required to be robust against rewatermarking since otherwise an attacker can defeat the
proof-of-ownership protocol by simply re-watermarking
the object.
Composite watermarks may or may not be separable,
depending on the way composition is performed. For
the examples in this paper, composition is performed by
simple vector or matrix addition of independently chosen,
randomly distributed watermark patterns. A statistical detector can separate the component watermarks since the
watermarking patterns are mutually uncorrelated. Some
more exotic methods of composition, such as those suggested by Guo and Georganas [8] may require modified
detectors. The specifics of each of our examples will be
discussed in Section 3.
Capacity. Obviously there is a limit to the number
of watermarks that any multimedia object can contain.
Watermarks formed by composition or re-watermarking
gradually degrade the image as each new watermark is
added. In a segmented watermark, the number of watermarks that can be embedded is limited by the number of
available segments.
In general, it seems reasonable to believe that the watermarking capacity of an object would be commensurate
with the number of authors working on it. It does not
seem very likely, for example, that a still image would require more than two or three authors to produce. Larger
works that may require large teams of authors to produce,
such as feature films, have a much greater watermarking
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capacity.

Any insider is able to take a copy of the object being authored at any time, and optionally make private changes
to it, possibly including “changes” made by ignoring the
2.2 Our Model
contributions of other authors. An object created other
In our collaborative version of the proof-of-ownership than by the legitimate publication procedure will be reproblem, our aim is to prevent a dishonest insider from ferred to as a rebel object. We will not attempt to predenying the contribution of other insiders. This is not vent authors from creating and publishing rebel objects,
much different from the aim in the conventional proof- since such activity is analogous to an outsider who takes
of-ownership problem, except that the dishonest outsider a copy of the published object and makes his or her own
in this model is replaced by a dishonest insider here. In changes to it, and this cannot be prevented in the general
both the conventional model and our one, an honest in- watermarking model. We do, however, demand that rebel
sider desires to produce evidence that proves his or her objects contain the watermarks of all the contributors to
case against the dishonest party.
the object, so that the rebel insider cannot deny the other
We define an insider as someone who has access to insiders’ contribution to any object, whether it is a rebel
the multimedia content before publication, such as an au- one or not.
thor. We will sometimes use the term “author” to mean an
actively contributing insider. Each insider is assumed to
have some secret information which he or she can use to 3 Architectures for Secure Authorembed a secret watermark known only to that insider. We
ing
will give some examples of how this secret information is
used in Section 3.
An outsider is anyone who is not an insider. We will not In this section, we will describe several possible architecexplicitly consider protection from dishonest outsiders in tures for multimedia authoring systems that provide intelthis paper. During the pre-publication phase, we assume lectual property protection against dishonest insiders who
that the insiders have suitable private channels which can- participate in the authoring process itself, avoiding the
not be listened to or tampered with by outsiders. (By vulnerability of the conventional approaches to dishonest
the letter of the definition, an outsider who could do such insiders described in Section 2. For ease of exposition,
we will describe only proof-of-ownership watermarking
things would become an insider).
in
this section. We will show how to adapt the construcWe are not aware of any method by which a computer
tions
here for fingerprinting in Section 4.
system can make artistic decisions about the contributions
As in the conventional proof-of-ownership case, we
of authors. We will therefore assume that
cannot appeal to encryption for protection against dishon• all insiders are permitted to make arbitrary changes est parties since all parties must have access to the unento the object being authored, whatever their per- crypted object if they are to make any use of it. Waterceived artistic value; and
marking aims to solve this problem by embedding sub• all insiders have an equal right to be represented as liminal information into an unencrypted object that deters
the owners of the finished object, whatever a human illegitimate use by threatening an illegitimate user with
detection.
judge might think of their contribution.
Our general approach is to maintain a version of
It is possible to develop more complex systems that use the work-in-progress that contains a “watermark-inaccess control structures to constrain authors to chang- progress”. Changes to the work-in-progress result in coring only certain regions of the object; give different pre- responding changes to the watermark. The authors, thereassigned weights to different authors’ watermarks; elimi- fore, do not have an opportunity to obtain an unwaternate insiders’ watermarks if that insider makes no contri- marked version of the object, but are still able to access
bution; and so forth, but for simplicity we will not discuss a usable version of the object. An author making some
these straightforward extensions here.
illegitimate use of the object can then be dealt with in the
May be reproduced for educational and scientific purposes without fee
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for all plaintexts X and Y , and keys k. For example, RSA
[17] is a privacy homomorphism with respect to fixed
point multiplication.
Let each author i have a secret watermark w i , and let
k be a global encryption key known to the authors (and
no one else, including the server). Let W (X, w) denote
watermarking an object X with a watermark w and let
g(X, δX) be a function that applies the changes δX to X.
We require that g(X, δX) be invertible, that is, given an
3.1 Authoring with a Trusted Repository
object X and another object X 0 , it is possible to compute
If the authors have access to a repository which they all δX such that
trust with their watermark information and the unwaterX 0 = g(X, δX).
marked original, it is relatively straightforward to impleLet E(X, k) be an encryption function that is a priment a solution to our problem, using an architecture simvacy homomorphism with respect to both W (X, w) and
ilar to the IETF’s WebDAV protocol [7].
g(X, δX).
Whenever an author wishes to make a change to the
To initialise the server, each author transmits E(w i , k)
object, the repository makes a watermarked version (conto the server using a private secure channel, and the server
taining the watermarks of all authors) of its master copy,
records the encrypted watermarks for future use. The
and transmits this to the editing author. The editing author
server’s master copy of the encrypted object can be initransmits the changes back to the repository, which incortialised by having an author choosing a random object X
porates them into its unwatermarked original. In a naı̈ve
and transmitting E(X, k) to the server. Alternatively, if
implementation, the master copy may become degraded
the encryption function is such that the server can randue to the repeated addition of watermarks every time the
domly generate a valid ciphertext without knowing the
object is checked out; however, we will give an example
key, it is possible for the server to simply choose its own
of how this can be avoided in Section 3.2.2.
random “encrypted” object E(X, k).
An author wishing to modify the object X makes a re3.2 Authoring with a Blind Repository
quest to the server. Let W ∗ (X, w1 , . . . , wm ) denote the
object X watermarked with each watermark w 1 up to
By embedding the watermark in an encrypted domain, it
wm in turn (by re-watermarking), where m is the numis possible to implement a system in which
ber of authors. Note that composition rather than re• no party, including the server, has access to the un- watermarking is also possible if the encryption function is
watermarked original X;
a privacy homomorphism with respect to the composition
function;
we will see an example of this in Section 3.2.2.
i
• the watermark w is known only to author i; and
The server computes
• all the authors have access to the watermarked object
W ∗ (E(X, k), E(w1 , k), . . . , E(wm , k))
X̂ containing all of the authors’ watermarks.
Some techniques for embedding watermarks in encrypted and transmits this to the author that made the request.
Since E(X, k) is a privacy homomorphism with redomains are described by Fridrich, et al. [6, 5], Yen
[22] and Memon and Wong [14]. Memon and Wong’s spect to W (X, w), we can see that
construction, based on a privacy homomorphism [18] beW ∗ (E(X, k), E(w1 , k), . . . , E(wm , k)) = E(X̂, k)
tween the encryption and watermarking functions, is the
by applying the homomorphic property m times. Hence,
most convenient for our purposes.
An encryption function E(X, k) is a privacy homomor- the author receiving E(X̂, k) can decrypt the watermarked object
phism with respect to a function f (X, Y ) if and only if
same way as in the conventional case.
Of course, any form of collaborative authoring system requires some form of concurrency control to prevent
mishaps due to two or more authors trying to edit the same
thing at the same time. This is a well-known problem with
well-known solutions in concurrent programming, and for
simplicity we will not explicitly mention them here.

E(f (X, Y ), k) = f (E(X, k), E(Y, k)),

X̂ = W ∗ (X, w1 , . . . , wm )
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and edit this object as normal to produce a new object
• applying changes in the transform domain is difficult
X̂ 0 . The server, however, cannot decrypt the object since
since human authors work in the spatial domain.
it does not know the key k.
As we do not need asymmetric encryption for our situThe author computes δX such that X̂ 0 = g(X̂, δX)
ation, a more convenient choice for the encryption funcand transmits E(δX, k) to the server (in practice, the aution is permutation in the spatial domain. Since permutathor may just create δX directly by storing the changes he
tion is homomorphic with respect to any pointwise funcor she makes). The server computes
tion, we have great flexibility in choosing a watermarking
E(g(X, δX), k) = g(E(X, k), E(δX, k)) ≈ E(X 0 , k) function. Let the watermark of author i be represented
by a matrix w i of the same size as the image to be waterand makes this its new master copy of the encrypted marked, and let watermarking be performed by matrix adobject. Some care needs to be taken in the choice of dition of the watermark to the image. Several simple wag(X, δX) to keep the approximation manageable. For a
termarking algorithms, such as the Patchwork algorithm
well-chosen g(X, δX), the approximation can be elimi- of Bender, et al. [1] and the algorithm of Pitas [16], can
nated altogether, and we will give an example of such a be implemented this way.
choice in Section 3.2.2.
A convenient choice for g(X, δX) is the function that
selectively replaces the elements of a p × q matrix X with
3.2.1 Limitations
those from another p × q matrix δX to form a new matrix
0
X
with
Memon and Wong note that this system of embedding

watermarks in an encrypted domain prevents the waterX(x, y), if δX(x, y) = −1
X 0 (x, y) =
.
marking algorithm from using any perceptual information
δX(x, y), otherwise
about the object. An alternative approach that may avoid
0
this problem is the random transform domain technique An inverse for any X and X using this function can be
of Fridrich, et al. [6, 5], in which watermarking is per- derived from a simple pointwise comparison.
With this choice of g(X, δX), watermarked pixels obformed in a random frequency-like domain. Due to space
tained
from the server and unmodified by the author are
considerations, we will not explore this alternative further
not
returned
to the server since they are at positions where
in the present paper.
δX(x, y) = −1. The only pixels incorporated into the
server’s master (unwatermarked) copy are the unwater3.2.2 An Example
marked ones created by authors after modifying the imIn their example of a homomorphic watermarker, Memon age.
Let κ be a permutation on the elements of a p×q matrix,
and Wong use RSA encryption and the watermarking alknown only to the authors. Let w i be a p × q watermarkgorithm of Cox, et al. [2]. However,
ing pattern known only to author i. Let the object being
• using a non-oblivious watermarking method is inauthored be X, and let the server have κ(X) and κ(w i )
convenient in our situation where we have stated that
for all authors i. The procedure for an author i to edit the
the original should be inaccessible (though a colluobject is the same as before, except that it is possible to
sion of the server and at least one author could reveal
use a composite watermark here:
it);
1. The server computes aPcomposed permuted water• asymmetric encryption such as RSA results in a
m
mark pattern κ(w ∗ ) = j=1 κ(wj ).
many-fold expansion in the size of the object when
2. The server computes the permuted watermarked obused in the pointwise fashion required for the conject by κ(X̂) = κ(X) + κ(w∗ ) [= κ(X + w∗ )], and
struction to work;
transmits κ(X̂) to author i.
• pointwise encryption is potentially vulnerable to attacks because of the small number of possible plain3. Author i uses the inverse permutation to get X̂ =
texts; and
κ−1 (κ(X + w∗ )) = X + w∗ .
May be reproduced for educational and scientific purposes without fee
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4. Author i makes changes δX to X̂, where δX is a
p × q matrix with entries of −1 where the pixel at
that position was unchanged, or the new pixel value
otherwise.

A simple-minded solution might be to disallow all-ofobject changes, but a patient author can still build up
knowledge of a collective watermark w ∗ using a sequence
of changes that, when taken together, cover the object. Alternatively, an author could be prohibited from accessing
5. Author i transmits κ(δX) to the server.
the object twice in a row, but a determined author may
still
be able to piece information together from points that
6. The server computes its new master copy of the per0
were
not changed by intermediate authors.
muted original by κ(X ) = g(κ(X), κ(δX)) [=
To
defeat this attack and other similar attacks based
κ(g(X, δX))].
on examining the output of the server for a speciallyUsing either the Patchwork or Pitas algorithms, the constructed input, either
composed watermark w ∗ can be detected as usual by a
conventional detector since it is a valid watermark pattern
• it should not be feasible to compute w ∗ given X and
of itself. It is also possible for a conventional detector
W (X, w∗ ), or
1
m
to separate the individual watermarks w , . . . , w since
• it should not be feasible to compute X given
they are uncorrelated and composition in this fashion is
W (X, w∗ ) and w∗ .
equivalent to re-watermarking in these systems.
3.2.3 An Attack
Given a watermarked object and its original version, an
attacker can attempt to estimate the watermark signal by
comparing the two. This leads to a variety of possible
attacks in which a dishonest author submits a speciallyconstructed object to the server, immediately requests the
watermarked version, and uses the two versions to obtain
information about the other authors’ watermarks.
Suppose, for example, an author creates an object X
and submits this to the server. This X could be the initial
object given to the server during the initialisation phase,
or it could be created by checking out an existing object
and over-writing it before re-submission.
If the author immediately requests the object again, the
author will obtain the watermarked version
X̂ = W (X, w1 , . . . , wm ).
The author now knows both X and its watermarked version, which may allow the author to compute the (composed) watermark. For example, in the permutation example above, the author can compute
X̂ − X

= (X + w∗ ) − X
= w∗

Knowledge of w ∗ , in the example system, allows the
author to remove the watermark from any image watermarked by the server by a simple matrix subtraction.

Watermarking schemes that satisfy one or the other of
these conditions are proposed by Depovere and Kalker [3]
and Stern and Tillich [21]. In these schemes, a single
detection key σ can be used to generate many different
watermark patterns w ∗ using a one-way function. Each
watermarked object is watermarked using the same σ but
a different w∗ . This approach prevents an attacker from
learning any information about σ even if he or she can
learn w∗ . Without knowledge of σ, an attacker cannot remove or otherwise tamper with watermarks created by the
server. Investigation of how these types of schemes can be
implemented in our architectures is a subject of on-going
research.

3.3

Authoring with Layers

In this section, we will consider an architecture for authoring that does not require a server, trusted or otherwise.
Consider a function U (X 1 , . . . , X m ) that takes a collection of layers X 1 , . . . , X m and merges them into a single
object X. A simple example is the function that overlays a collection of line-drawings on transparent backgrounds, producing an object containing every line from
every drawing. For a suitable choice of U (X 1 , . . . , X m ),
we can arrange for an object X = U (X 1 , . . . , X m ) to be
manipulated by a collection of m authors who each make
changes to one layer only.
Let each author i own a layer and maintain two versions
of this layer: an unwatermarked layer X i , and a water-
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marked layer X̂ i = W (X i , wi ) where W (X, w) denotes
watermarking an object X with a watermark w. The former is a secret of its author, and the latter is public. Of
course the author need not embed his or her watermark
in the public layer if he or she does not want to, making
the public layer the same as the “private” layer, but this
in no way affects the other authors’ watermarks. Anyone
knowing all of the public layers can compute an object
X̂ = U (X̂ 1 , . . . , X̂ m ).
To make a change to the object, an author i first makes
the appropriate change to his or her private layer X i . He
or she then computes a new version of the public layer
X̂ i corresponding to the new private layer, and publishes
the new X̂ i . The other authors may then re-compute their
copy of the merged object.
A rebel author may choose to create a rebel object by
ignoring broadcasts from some particular author i. The
rebel object thus produced will not contain the watermark
wi , and therefore author i cannot claim any contribution
to the rebel object. This is unavoidable in this architecture, and it is debatable as to whether or not author i
should be able to claim contribution to an object from
which his or her contribution has been erased. Eliminating one author, however, does not affect the ability of the
other authors to exhibit their watermarks in the rebel object.
Of course, it is not automatic that the watermarks in
the X̂ i s will survive the merging process for any arbitrary
combination of watermarking and merging functions. We
will give an example in which there is a statistical expectation that the watermarks can be detected in the merged
object, but we do not know of any way of guaranteeing
this while still providing a useful merging function.
3.3.1 An Example

unwatermarked p × q image (layer) X i and a public, watermarked p × q image X̂ i . These are both initialised to
zero. Each author i also has a private p × q watermark
pattern wi with standard normal distribution (i.e. each
element of wi is randomly chosen from a normal distribution with mean zero and standard deviation one), as usual
in JAWS.
Each author also maintains a copy of a p × q matrix Y with entries from 1, . . . , m, which is initialised
randomly. To compute the merged, watermarked image
X̂ = U (X̂ 1 , . . . , X̂ m ), every author can compute
X̂(x, y) = X̂ Y (x,y) .
The authors do not need to agree on an initial Y since
every author’s layer is identical in the beginning. Even
if the layers are not identical, choosing one is as good as
choosing the next.
If an author i wishes to make a change to a set of pixel
locations D, he or she makes the appropriate changes in
X i and computes X 0 = U (X̂ 1 , . . . , X i , . . . , X̂ m ), i.e.
 i
X (x, y),
if Y (x, y) = i
0
X (x, y) =
.
X̂ Y (x,y) (x, y), otherwise
The author computes the perceptual mask λ of X 0 as usual
in JAWS, i.e.


−1 −1 −1
1
λ=
−1
8 −1  ∗ X 0
9
−1 −1 −1
where ‘∗’ denotes convolution, and computes the watermarked values for all the pixel locations (x, y) ∈ D using
the usual JAWS embedding function
X̂ i (x, y) = X i (x, y) + αλ(x, y)wi (x, y)

We will describe a layered watermarking system for raster
images, using the JAWS watermark of Kalker, et al.
[11], except that for simplicity of exposition we will
not use translation invariance. While this watermark’s
stated purpose is broadcast monitoring rather than proofof-ownership, it is a convenient example for our purposes.
For simplicity, we will assume that the images are greyscale though it is easy to extend the procedure to colour
images.
As described above, each author i maintains a private,

where α is a global scaling parameter. The other pixels of
X̂ i are left unchanged.
The other authors are then informed of the change by
a broadcast of D by author i. Each author then updates
their copy of Y by setting
Y (x, y) = i for all (x, y) ∈ D,
leaving other entries in Y unchanged. Note that an author
can also choose a rebel Y , thus creating a rebel object, but
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this object still contains the other authors’ watermarks unless one author has been targeted for removal as described
in the introduction this section.
The resulting watermark is a kind of segmented watermark. If the watermark detector has access to Y , it can
partially invert the merging function to obtain a set of layers, each containing the pixels watermarked by a particular author (with zeros where the contents of that layer are
unknown).
Since the watermark patterns are mutually uncorrelated, however, it is possible for a detector to test for a
given watermark pattern without knowledge of Y , using
the normal JAWS detection algorithm. To test an image Z
for the presence of a watermark w, we filter Z with


1 −2
1
1
4 −2  ∗ Z,
Z 0 =  −2
4
1 −2
1

and then compute the correlation of Z 0 with w. Even
though only some of the pixels of X̂ come from the layer
containing a watermark pattern w i , the correlation of X̂
with wi is still high, as
Pp Pq
i
wi · X̂ =
x=1
y=1 w (x, y)(X(x, y) +
αλ(x, y)wY (x,y) (x, y))
Pp Pq
wi (x, y)X(x, y) +
=
Px=1 y=1
αλ(x, y)(wi (x, y))2 +
PY (x,y)=i
Y (x,y)
(x, y)wi (x, y)
Y (x,y)6=i αλ(x, y)w
X
≈
αλ(x, y)(wi (x, y))2
Y (x,y)=i

> 0
since the expected correlation of w i with the original image and the other watermarks is zero. This is the same
idea as used by the asymmetric watermark of Hartung and
Girod [10]; in fact, Eggers, et al. [4] suggest that Hartung
and Girod’s method might be more useful as a multiple
watermark than as an asymmetric one.

makes a rough sketch of a scene he or she wants drawn,
then other artists move in to fill out the details, obliterating the sketch. No watermark can survive a complete
re-drawing of the image (whether or not the new image
is semantically related to the old one), so it is difficult to
see how any useful merging function could preserve watermarks in such obliterated contributions.

3.4

Authoring with Instructions

A special case of the layered authoring system described
in the previous section is the case where the object is created by authors who issue streams of instructions to make
changes to the object, such as “draw a line here”, “make
this pixel blue”, etc. The final object can be thought of
as the interleaving (“merging”) of the individual instruction streams (“layers”) of each author. The Network Text
Editor of Handley and Crowcroft [9], for example, uses
a similar architecture. Clearly, this model is well-suited
to formats that represent objects by a sequence of rendering primitives, such as text or vector graphics, rather than
formats that represent objects by raster data.
The system is initialised by each author creating an
empty object. Let each author i have a secret watermark
wi , and let X i = X1i , X2i , . . . denote the stream of instructions issued by author i.
To issue an instruction Xji to make a change to the object, an author i computes a watermarked version of the
instruction X̂ji = W (Xji , wi ), and broadcasts X̂ji to all of
the authors, who append this to their local copy of the object. The unwatermarked version Xji is discarded (though
there is no reason author i couldn’t keep it if he or she
wanted to).
As in the layered system, an author can choose to ignore the broadcasts of other authors and create a rebel object with an eliminated author. In this architecture, this
is equivalent to an outsider who crops instructions from
the final object, which is unavoidable in the general watermarking model.

3.3.2 Limitations
This system does not guarantee that an author’s watermark will be detectable in the final object, since it is entirely possible that an author’s contribution will be obliterated by later authors over-writing that author’s contribution. Consider, for example, the case where some director

3.4.1 On Instruction Complexity
Depending on the complexity of the instructions used, it
may or may not be possible to embed an entire watermark
into a single instruction. Solachidis, et al., for example,
propose a watermark for polylines [20] that could be used
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to embed a whole watermark into an instruction to draw a
polyline or similar complex shape.
However, multimedia languages typically make use of
many much simpler instructions such as “put text here” or
“draw a line” that have only one or two points available
for embedding watermark information. In this case, the
watermark information needs to be distributed over many
instructions. Let the watermark pattern w i of a participant
i be made up of a sequence of n components w1i , . . . , wni ,
and let f (Xj , wli ) be a function for embedding a watermark component wli into an instruction Xj . Let τ (·) be
some mapping of instructions to the integers 1, . . . , n.
Then an author i can embed a watermark component in
each instruction Xj by
X̂j = f (Xj , wτi (Xj ) ).

A radical format conversion may destroy the watermark
completely; this is true of any watermark, not just ones
created by instruction streams.
3.4.3 An Example
We will describe a system for authoring two-dimensional
vector graphics where authors may draw lines, circles,
polygons, etc.. We will use a very simple watermark similar to the one suggested by Koh and Chen [12], but ours
will be robust against re-ordering of drawing elements.
We assume that every drawing primitive is associated with
one or more points in the plane, such as
• the end-points of a line,
• the centre of a circle,

A simple choice for τ (·) would be to number instruc• the vertices of a polygon,
tions according to the order in which they were issued,
• etc.
i.e.
τ (Xj ) = j mod n + 1.
and consider each point vj individually.
We will assume that all points lie in the first quadrant of
However, this is a poor choice since the instructions may,
the
Cartesian plane, that is, that the origin is at the bottomin general, be re-ordered without affecting the way the
left
of the drawing space. We associate a point vj with a
object is rendered. A more robust choice is to determine
bin
bτ (vj ) by dividing the drawing space into n sectors
τ (Xj ) by some property of Xj that cannot be changed so
using
n radial lines emanating from the origin at equallyeasily, such as its position in the drawing space. We will
spaced
angles. That is, let (r(vj ), θ(vj )) denote the polar
give an example of such a function in Section 3.4.3.
co-ordinates of a point vj and set


3.4.2 On the Output Format
2n
τ (vj ) =
θ(vj ) + 1.
The raw instruction streams issued by authors are unlikely
π
to make an attractive format for distribution. We can exLet wi = w1i , . . . , wni denote the watermark of author i,
pect that the raw instruction streams will contain many
instructions that make corrections to earlier instructions. where each wji is drawn from a standard normal distribuDistributing such redundant instructions is not only ineffi- tion. We compute the watermarked version v̂j of a point
cient, but may also be unimplementable on output devices vj by
such as printers that cannot alter the effect of any instrucr(v̂j ) = r(vj ) + αwτi (vj )
tions once they have been carried out.
We can therefore expect some degree of postθ(v̂j ) = θ(vj )
processing on the instruction stream to put it into an acceptable format for distribution. This may mean removing for some agreed global scaling parameter α. That is, the
redundant instructions, or combining a series of correc- point is moved further away from or closer to the origin
tive instructions into a single instruction, or radical format by an amount proportional to wτi (vj ) .
conversions such as rasterisation. It is inevitable that waAs for the general layered watermark, the watermark
termark information will be lost in the process, and possi- resulting from a collection of collaborating authors is a
bly whole contributions obliterated as in the layered case. segmented watermark and can be detected by breaking
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the instruction stream into the streams contributed by each
author. However, it is possible, and more convenient, to
detect the individual watermark as if the object contained
a composite watermark as in the layered example. This
can be done for a watermark w i using the correlation of
the points’ distances from the origin
r = r(v1 ), r(v2 ), . . . r(vt )
with the vector of corresponding watermark components
w̃i = wτi (v1 ) , wτi (v2 ) , . . . , wτi (vt ) .
If the correlation is high, we report that the watermark is
present, otherwise we report that it is not.

4 Fingerprinting

In general, fingerprints may be chosen to have various
useful properties such as collusion security. For simplicity
and due to space considerations, we will not consider such
properties here. We require only that each author receives
a version of the work containing a distinct watermark.

4.1

With a Server

Implementing fingerprinting is straightforward using a
server. The server simply chooses a distinct watermark
wi for each author i known only to the server, and embeds
wi (only) into any objects that are transmitted to author i.
If author i leaks a copy of the object, the author can be
traced by the presence of w i in the leaked copy.

4.2

Without a Server

Without a server, it is necessary for every author i to
choose a distinct fingerprint w i,j for every co-author j.
When making a change to the object, author i must generate a version of the change for each fingerprint w i,j
and transmit this version to author j over a private channel instead of using the broadcast channel as before. In
this way, each author i has a copy of the object containing a collection of m − 1 fingerprints w 1,i , w2,i , . . . , etc.,
uniquely identifying that author’s copy. Assuming that
the watermark in use is separable, any author j who leaks
a copy can be traced by the presence in the leaked copy of
any one of w i,j for some other author i.
Since each fingerprint w i,j is known by author i, it may
be possible for author i to attempt to frame author j by
leaking a copy of the object containing w i,j . A simple solution would be to use majority voting in the tracing algorithm, and require that the majority of fingerprints found
in a leaked copy correspond to the accused author. Since a
dishonest author i’s object also contains the m − 1 fingerprints assigned to i by the other authors, this test would
correctly identify i as the leaker. However, it is still possible for a majority of authors acting in collusion to frame
an author in the minority.
A more robust, but more complicated, solution is to use
asymmetric fingerprinting [15] (also known as a buyer• watermarks (i.e. fingerprints) are not known by the
seller protocol [14]). In these protocols, the fingerprinter
owner of that watermark; and
(author i in the above) and the fingerprintee (author j) in• each author should have a distinct (fingerprinted) teract during the fingerprinting process in such a way that
version of the object.
the fingerprinter cannot obtain a copy of the fingerprinted

For simplicity, in this section we will assume that proofof-ownership is not an issue. Suppose, for example, that
the authors are employees of a company and do not own
the intellectual property in their work. However, leaking
a copy of their work prior to the official company publication may compromise the company’s intellectual property, and the company might be interested in learning who
made the leak.
In the watermarking solution to this problem, each legitimate copy of the object is embedded with a distinct
watermark, called a fingerprint, that identifies the owner
of that copy. If one of the legitimate owners makes an illegitimate copy, and this copy is found by investigators,
this copy can be traced to the owner using the fingerprint
in it.
As in the proof-of-ownership case, it is easy to see that
a dishonest insider in possession of the unwatermarked
original can circumvent the tracing protocol. In this section, we will consider how the architectures described in
Section 3 can be adapted to solve the fingerprinting problem in the presence of dishonest insiders.
In order to implement fingerprinting, there are two
basic changes that need to be made to the proof-ofownership systems described in the previous sections:
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object. Every time author i makes a change to the object,
In the proof-of-ownership case, all authors have exactly
he or or she must execute the asymmetric fingerprinting the same information about the original object and about
protocol with every other author j, using fingerprint w i,j . other authors’ watermarks (which, ideally, is no information at all). Hence a collusion will not reveal any information to the colluders other than the colluders’ own water5 Discussion
marks, and what they already knew by virtue of their being insiders. Since all the watermarks are independently
5.1 Security
chosen and embedded, the colluders have not improved
Our systems permit authors to access only watermarked their chances of defeating the non-colluders’ watermarks
versions of the object they are working on, and hence an over an insider acting alone.
insider wishing to deny the contribution of the other authors, or leak an illegitimate copy of the object, would
ideally be in the same position as an outsider attempting
to do the same. The systems described above do not quite
meet this ideal, since
• insiders see many different objects (being different
versions of the object-in-progress) containing the
same watermark, potentially giving insiders greater
opportunity for attacks that attempt to estimate the
watermark; and
• insiders generally know the source of any change,
and therefore which pixels or instructions are watermarked by which author, and can use this knowledge
to target a particular watermark.
Of course, if the watermark being used was perfectly secure (in the sense that it is unremovable without unacceptably degrading the object), this extra knowledge should
not matter, but on current watermarking technology, this
seems a little optimistic.

5.2 Collusions
A group of dishonest insiders may pool their information
in an attempt to defeat the watermarks of insiders from
outside the colluding group. This sort of attack is commonly considered in fingerprinting systems, where the
colluders are a collection of outsiders. Here, such colluders may be insiders as well, but as we have observed in
the previous section, inside colluders are in the same position as outside colluders since the insiders have access
only to a fingerprinted version of the object. Hence we expect that fingerprinting algorithms that are secure against
outsider collusions should also be secure against insider
collusions.

6

Conclusion

We have introduced the problem of protecting the intellectual property rights of multimedia content owners
where potentially malicious insiders have access to the
content before publication. Conventional watermarking
solutions to the proof-of-ownership problem cannot resolve intellectual property disputes that arise prior to publication, and conventional fingerprinting solutions cannot
trace leakers who leak pre-publication versions of content, since the adversary in such situations has access to
an unwatermarked version of the content.
We have proposed several possible architectures for
watermarking with dishonest insiders, in which insiders
have access only to a watermarked version of the object
that they are working on. Hence, an insider is in not much
better a position to defeat the watermark than an outsider.
If watermarks had perfect security, insiders would not be
in a better position at all.
Our systems cannot be guaranteed to successfully resolve any particular intellectual property dispute in a collaborative environment, and we do not think that any currently known (or even foreseen) computer system can,
since
• computers cannot make artistic judgements on the
worth of any particular contribution;
• realistic authors will generally use out-of-band communications such as face-to-face meetings to exchange ideas; and
• we cannot watermark the semantics of multimedia
content.
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However, the architectures proposed in this paper provide [9] M. Handley and J. Crowcroft. Network Text Eda basis for the development of systems that can assist in
itor (NTE): A scalable shared text editor for the
resolving intellectual property disputes between collaboMBone. In ACM SIGCOMM, pages 197–208,
rators by providing at least some evidence of what hapCannes, France, 1997.
pened prior to publication, and we are hopeful that further
research can overcome at least some of the limitations we [10] F. Hartung and B. Girod. Fast public-key watermarking of compressed video. In IEEE Internahave noted.
tional Conference on Image Processing, pages 528–
531, Santa Barbara, USA, 1997.

References
[1] W. Bender, D. Gruhl, N. Morimoto, and A. Lu.
Techniques for data hiding. IBM Systems Journal,
35:313–336, 1996.

[11] T. Kalker, G. Depovere, J. Haitsma, and M. Maes.
A video watermarking system for broadcast monitoring. In IS&T/SPIE Conference on Security and
Watermarking of Multimedia Contents, pages 103–
122, San Jose, USA, 1999.

[2] I. J. Cox, J. Kilian, T. Leighton, and T. Shamoon.
A secure, robust watermark for multimedia. In [12] B. Koh and T. Chen. Progressive browsing of 3D
models. In IEEE Workshop on Multimedia Signal
First Information Hiding Workshop, pages 185–206,
Processing,
pages 71–76, Copenhagen, Denmark,
Cambridge, UK, 1996.
1999.
[3] G. Depovere and T. Kalker. Secret key watermarking with changing keys. In IEEE International Con- [13] G. C. Langelaar, I. Setyawan, and R. L. Lagendijk.
Watermarking digital image and video data: A stateference on Image Processing, pages 427–429, 2000.
of-the-art overview. IEEE Signal Processing Maga[4] J. J. Eggers, J. K. Su, and B. Girod. Asymzine, pages 20–46, September 2000.
metric watermarking schemes. In M. Schumacher
and R. Steinmetz, editors, Sicherheit in Netzen und [14] N. Memon and P. W. Wong. A buyer-seller watermarking protocol. IEEE Transactions on Image ProMedienströmen, pages 124–133, Berlin, Germany,
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